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APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN DNA
COLLECTED FOR ONE PURPOSE IS TESTED FOR
ANOTHER
Kelly Lowenberg*
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) contains sensitive information about a
person’s identity, family, and medical risks. As our understanding of
genetics improves, DNA that was originally collected by the
government for one purpose is becoming useful for other purposes.
Some states are now testing DNA originally collected for
identification or medical screening for other purposes, including
research and determining whether two people are related. Once the
government has taken and tested your DNA, what else can the
government reasonably do with it? While others have discussed how
the Fourth Amendment limits the initial DNA collection and testing,
this Article is the first to examine how the Fourth Amendment applies
when these DNA samples are tested for new information.
Because DNA contains a vast amount of information in a microscopic
space, rules that traditionally restrict government conduct might be
insufficient to establish appropriate limits on how DNA can be
analyzed. Drawing on computer-search law in which courts address
similar problems, this Article proposes that the Fourth Amendment be
applied to focus on what information has been exposed rather than
whether a physical zone has been penetrated. This approach would
require a warrant or an applicable warrant exception before a DNA
sample could be retested for additional genetic information. Applying
the Fourth Amendment to DNA testing in this manner is doctrinally
supported and strikes the best balance between allowing the
government to analyze stored DNA for new purposes when necessary
and protecting genetic information from being unreasonably revealed.

* The author is currently serving as a law clerk for the Honorable Edward J. Davila. While
writing this Article, she was a fellow at the Stanford Law School Center for Law and the Biosciences.
For valuable conversations and criticisms, I am grateful to Hank Greely, Robert Weisberg,
Elizabeth Joh, Alex Pollen, Dov Fox, Ryan Calo, Brenda Simon, Tim Tatarka, Zac Cox, EunHae Park,
Dmitry Karshtedt, Alyson Yamada, and Elizabeth Greisman. Thanks also to the staff of The University
of Cincinnati Law Review for outstanding editorial support.
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INTRODUCTION
The Grim Sleeper, a serial killer, was arrested decades after his first
murder, with the aid of a new deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) forensic
technique called familial DNA searching. 1 Police had compared DNA
found at crime scenes with DNA of known convicts stored in a database,
but no complete matches were found. In the past, that would have been
a dead end; however, by performing additional testing on stored DNA
samples that partially matched the killer, the investigators established
that the killer was closely related to a convicted felon 2 and used this
information to finally close a decades-old case. The utility of additional
DNA testing in capturing the Grim Sleeper suggests that law
enforcement may be well served by exploring additional information

1. Maura Dolan et al., DNA Leads to Arrest in Serial Case, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at A1.
2. See discussion of familial searching, infra at p. 1295.
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contained in DNA beyond a handful of identity markers.
The government can lawfully collect, analyze, and retain DNA from
many groups of peopleconvicts, arrestees, military personnel,
suspects, crime victims, and newborn babies. This collection and initial
analysis must pass Fourth Amendment muster, but the law is not clear
on whether these DNA samples, once analyzed, can be analyzed a
second or a third time.
Familial searching is only one example of the many additional tests
that might be conducted on DNA. DNA contains information that can
be used to establish our identities and genealogies as well as to predict
phenotypic traits like disease risk. Revealing genetic information can
have criminal, financial, and psychological consequences for an
individual. But this information can also serve important government
interests. Can DNA taken from newborns be tested for criminal
identification purposes? Could DNA taken from crime victims be tested
to establish paternity? Can these stored DNA samples be tested for
genetic medical research? Does the Fourth Amendment limit what the
government can search for in stored and partially analyzed DNA?
Fourth Amendment law regarding searches of DNA and other
information-rich materials is not very developed. The best indicator of
how courts will apply the Fourth Amendment to regulate additional
DNA testing is how they have dealt with similar issues in searches of
computers.
Like DNA, computers contain a large amount of
information in a very small space and all that raw material must be
seized because relevant information cannot be separated from irrelevant
information at the site of the search.
The Fourth Amendment has traditionally focused on whether the
government may penetrate the physical boundaries of a particular
space—enter a house or open a container. Courts have strained to
analogize between the physical boundaries of a container and the
physical disks in a computer. But this analogy comes apart when
applied to DNA and would leave sensitive genetic information contained
in DNA specimens, already tested for one purpose, completely
unprotected. Rather, emerging Fourth Amendment law that focuses on
the content of what is revealed rather than simply the form of the search
is better suited to limit genetic testing.
Part I of this Article provides background on DNA and on relevant
Fourth Amendment law. Part II discusses problems with limiting the
scope of a DNA search merely by focusing on the collection of DNA.
Part III draws on computer-search law to evaluate different applications
of Fourth Amendment law to an information-rich context and proposes
the most suitable approach to regulating DNA analysis.
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By limiting the zone of a DNA search to the information that is
exposed to the analyst, privacy interests in unrevealed genetic
information will be preserved. Thus, the Fourth Amendment would
require a warrant or an applicable warrant exception before a DNA
sample can be retested for additional genetic information. This
approach would allow the government to analyze stored DNA for new
purposes when necessary, such as catching the next Grim Sleeper and
would also protect genetic information from being unreasonably
revealed.
I. BACKGROUND ON DNA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Before analyzing how the Fourth Amendment applies to these DNA
samples and what this indicates about the direction of the Fourth
Amendment, this first subsection introduces the basic facts of DNA and
how it is currently analyzed. Additionally, this Part will review how
DNA collection has fit into the Fourth Amendment framework, and
where the courts’ involvement has ended and DNA testing by the
government has continued.
A. Background on DNA Analysis
DNA is an information-rich material contained in every cell in our
bodies. DNA can be collected from a person by swabbing the inside of
the person’s cheek or drawing blood, and the DNA in the nuclei of the
cells in the cheek swab or blood sample can be isolated. DNA is also
contained in each cell’s mitochondria, but forensic testing is more
commonly conducted on nuclear DNA. Each person’s DNA contains
two sets of twenty-three chromosomes, each set containing over 3
billion nucleotide bases. 3 One set of chromosomes is inherited from
one’s mother, and one set from one’s father. Some portions of the DNA,
such as genes, code for proteins, and other portions control expression of
those genes. Still other portions, as far as can be determined, do neither
and do not indicate anything about how the person is predisposed to look
or behave. The variation in DNA contains information about a person’s
identity, genealogy, and phenotype.

3. LISTER HILL NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOMEDICAL COMMC’NS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GENETICS HOME REFERENCE: HANDBOOK 9, 46 (2011), Human Genome Reference, available
at http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook.pdf.
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1. Identity
Unless a person has an identical twin, DNA can be used as a unique
identifier of a person. A perfect match between two samples of DNA
indicates that both samples came from the same person. Only a portion
of DNA needs to be tested to obtain enough information to affirmatively
link a DNA sample to a single person.
The most common form of DNA analysis used to match samples and
test for identification in forensic laboratories worldwide analyzes only
certain non-coding and non-regulatory regions of DNA. These
particular regions of DNA, known as short tandem repeats or satellite
tandem repeats (STRs), contain an abundant number of short strings of
nucleotides that are prone to repeating. For example, on one
chromosome a particular STR might have a set of four nucleotides that
repeat three times: ACCTACCTACCT. 4 The number of times these
strings repeat varies between individuals. 5 Each person has two copies,
or alleles, of each STR locus, one on a chromosome inherited from each
parent.
In the United States, in the 1990s the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) chose thirteen STRs that had a wide range of variation in the
population in the number of repeats to be the basis for a DNA
identification profile. 6 These have become known as the Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS) loci. For the thirteen STRs chosen by the
FBI, the repeated sequences are four or five nucleotides in length, and
there are five to twenty different common variations on the length of the
string of repeats. 7 For example, one of the STR loci used by the FBI
consists of repeats of AATG located on the short arm of chromosome
eleven. 8
In addition to the core thirteen CODIS markers, the
amelogenin genes on both the X and Y chromosome are genotyped to
indicate the person’s sex. 9 The variability in the twenty-six alleles (two
4. Genetic code consists of four nucleic acid bases: adenine (“A”), thymine (“T”), cytosine
(“C”) and guanine (“G”). For more information, see id. at 9.
5. Bruce Budowle & Angela van Daal, Forensically Relevant SNP classes, 44 BIOTECHNIQUES
603, 604 (2008).
6. Nat’l
Inst.
of
Standards
&
Tech.,
FBI
CODIS
Core
STR
Loci,
http://www.cstl.nist.gov/strbase/fbicore.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2010). See John M. Butler, Genetics
and Genomics of Core STR Loci Used in Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 253, 253 (2006).
7. Budowle & van Daal, supra note 5, at 604.
8. Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., STR Fact Sheet—TH01, http://www.cstl.nist.gov/strbase/
str_TH01.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2010).
9. K.M. Sullivan et al., A Rapid and Quantitative DNA Sex Test: Fluorescence-Based PCR
Analysis of X-Y Homologous Gene Amelogenin, 15 BIOTECHNIQUES 637 (1993) (explaining that a
woman with two X chromosomes will have two versions of the amelogenin gene of the same length,
while a man with an X and a Y chromosome will have two amelogenin genes with different lengths).
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at each of the thirteen loci) is so great that, apart from identical twins, it
is extremely unlikely that any two humans share the same set of
alleles. 10
When a DNA sample is collected, a personal profile is created
containing numbers indicating the length of those twenty-six repeats
(two strings of repeats at each of the thirteen locations) and then added
to local, 11 state, and national databases. The combined system of these
databases, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), is maintained by
the FBI. 12 These databases are used to compare existing DNA profiles
to DNA samples found at crime scenes in order to identify the source of
the crime scene sample. 13
2. Genealogy
DNA can also reveal information about a person’s genealogy. Taking
a historical view, DNA can indicate in what continent or region a
person’s ancestors lived. A simpler form of genealogical information
that is useful forensically is whether two people are related. A partial
match between two DNA samples indicates that the two donors have a
common genetic lineage. Because of differences in mutation rates and
differences between chromosomes, a match between particular DNA
regions is more informative of a familial relationship than a match
between other regions. For example, a match between DNA regions on
the Y chromosome is more indicative of patrilineal ancestry because
men have two copies of every chromosome except their Y chromosome,
of which each man only has one, inherited directly from his father.
Matching STRs on the Y chromosomes, in conjunction with the
thirteen CODIS loci, can provide further information about whether and
how closely two men are related through their male ancestors. This

10. The statistical uniqueness of a DNA profile is on the order of one in several hundred
quadrillions. For example, in People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 62 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
72 (2010), the defendant’s DNA profile was predicted to be “unique, occurring in approximately 1 in 21
sextillion of the Caucasian population, 1 in 650 quadrillion of the African American population, 1 in 420
sextillion of the Hispanic population.”
11. A growing number of local DNA databases are not restricted to criminals. Some include the
DNA of victims, suspects, or lab workers. These “rogue databases” are not included in CODIS but
“rules about their use by law enforcement agencies are unclear.” Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of
Family, a Tool to Make Arrests, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2009, at 2, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/20/AR2008042002388.html.
12. FBI, CODIS Brochure, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/html/codisbrochure_text.htm (last visited
Aug. 6, 2010).
13. In addition to the convicted offender database, there are also databases for crime scene DNA,
for arrestee DNA, for missing persons DNA, for unidentified human remains, and biological relatives of
missing persons. Id.
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Y chromosome genotyping is called Y-STR typing. Y-STR typing is
similar to the STR analysis described earlier, except that it uses DNA
located at ten additional loci on the Y chromosome. Men who share a
common genetic father or paternal grandfather will share the same Y
STRs. 14
Information about whether two people are related can be used to
generate leads in a criminal investigation, as in the Grim Sleeper case.
The Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, 15 a group of
forensic scientists that works under the guidance of the FBI,
recommends that states conduct Y-STR typing as a standard part of their
familial searching programs. 16 At least twelve states recommend or
require some additional genetic analysis, usually Y-STR typing, be
performed before the identity of a possible relative is disclosed. 17 This
extra genotyping is useful because “[a]ny offenders not eliminated by
the Y-STR type comparison could be patrilineally related to the true
perpetrator and will be candidates for further investigation and
consideration as potential genetic relatives of the true perpetrator.” 18
Familial searching need not stop with Y-STRs. After all, focusing on
the Y chromosome limits analysis to the paternal line of relatives. If
more STR loci were analyzed on the other chromosomes, familial
searching would be able to say more about two people’s degree of
relatedness. At the extreme, all the DNA samples stored by government
could be fully sequenced and clustered by similarity. These more
extensive methodologies for familial searching would yield information
that might catch the next Grim Sleeper, but it would also incidentally
reveal a large amount of other genetic information.
3. Phenotype
DNA also contains other personal information beyond these common
forensic uses.
A person’s observable characteristics—such as
appearance, health, and behavior—are called the person’s phenotype.
Phenotype is a result of the interaction between a person’s genetics and
14. Press Release, George B. Anderson, Dir., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, DNA Partial Match (Crime
Scene DNA Profile to Offender) Policy (Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://www.aclunc.org/news/
press_releases/asset_upload_file504_8577.pdf (codifying Y-STR typing protocol for familial searching).
15. Nat’l Forensic Sci. Tech. Ctr., Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods,
http://www.nfstc.org/pdi/Subject10/pdi_s10_m03_01_d.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
16. GENETIC INFO. WORK GROUP, MINN. DEPT. OF ADMIN., SEARCHING THE CONVICTED
OFFENDER REGISTRY 33 (2008), www.ipad.state.mn.us/docs/geninfo17.pdf.
17. Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 796
(2011).
18. Press Release, Anderson, supra note 14, at 27.
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environment, and it can be partly predicted by DNA testing. Some
phenotypic information, like eye color, can be easily observed by
looking at a person and is not private. Other phenotypic information,
like a predisposition to a genetic disease, may not even be known by the
individual herself.
Some genetic correlates of disease are highly predictive. For
example, if a person has the nucleotide bases CAG repeated more than
thirty-six times at a particular location on the short arm of one of their
copies of chromosome four, that person will develop Huntington’s
disease, a fatal neurological and motor disorder. The number of CAG
repeats can also predict how early that person will start to experience
symptoms of Huntington’s disease. Similarly, other gene mutations are
highly predictive of diseases like early-onset Alzheimer’s disease or
Lynch syndrome, which can lead to many forms of cancer. Other
diseases, like hemophilia and Tay-Sachs disease, require a person to
have two copies of a disease-linked gene. A person with only one
version of the gene will not show symptoms, but could have an affected
child if the other parent is also a carrier. In contrast to these rare, highly
predictive mutations, there are many common variants that more
modestly predict disease risk, for example risk for some kinds of
cancer 19 and late-onset Alzheimer’s disease. 20
Research efforts to better understand common genetic variations that
increase a person’s risk for disease focus on identifying individual
nucleotide bases that have been substituted with a different base. These
single nucleotide differences between people are called “SNPs” or
“single nucleotide polymorphisms.” If a SNP is located in a gene or a
regulatory region, the SNP itself may cause the increased disease risk.
However, even if a SNP does not cause the difference in disease risk,
it may be linked to a genetic variant that does. In those cases, the
presence of the SNP will still provide information about a person’s
disease risk. SNPs can be linked to other gene variants as a result of
“linkage disequilibrium.” Each time a person produces gametes (sperm
or eggs), the person’s two sets of chromosomes recombine in different
ways—sections of DNA on a pair of chromosomes switch places—and
these recombination events create variation. Although many of these
19. See, e.g., D. Ford et al., Genetic Heterogeneity and Penetrance Analysis of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 Genes in Breast Cancer Families, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 676 (1998); J. Kononen et al.,
Tissue Microarrays for High-Throughput Molecular Profiling of Tumor Specimens, 4 NATURE MED.
844 (1998).
20. See, e.g., E.H. Corder et al., Gene Doses of Apolipoprotein E Type 4 Allele and the Risk of
Alzheimer’s Disease in Late Onset Families, 261 SCI. 921, 921–22 (1993) (explaining that APOE has
three alleles: APOE-2, APOE-3, and APOE-4, and the risk of Alzheimer’s disease increases with the
number of APOE-4 alleles).
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recombination events may take place over the length of the
chromosome, it is less likely that much recombination will occur in any
small portion of DNA. As a result, nucleotide bases located close
together are likely to travel together. If you know a person has one of
those bases, then you can strongly predict that the other base is present
as well; these two bases are in linkage disequilibrium. More
colloquially, one might say that the SNP travels with the genetic variant
that causes the disease.
Major government-sponsored research projects looking for genomewide associations with disease focus on identifying informative SNPs.
Private companies are also conducting research on SNPs and selling
their DNA-testing services to people who are interested in learning what
their SNPs say about them. SNPs may contain “a wealth of genetic
information that can be tapped, since approximately 85% of human
variation is derived from SNPs.” 21
In addition to these single nucleotide changes, larger structural
variation is increasingly being recognized as abundant and important for
phenotype. 22 Some people may have entire regions of DNA repeated or
missing. There will be fewer of these structural variants, called copy
number variants, than SNPs in any one person’s genome, but each
variant covers more sequence and may make more substantial
contributions to phenotype.
A person’s DNA, through SNPs or copy number variants, might also
indicate her genetic risk for developing a psychiatric disorder. 23
Researchers are investigating the role of genetics in highly heritable
psychiatric disorders, such as alcoholism, schizophrenia, and bipolar
disorder.
Despite the high heritability of these disorders, few
reproducible genetic risk factors have been identified.
Some research is also being done into whether DNA variations are
associated with behavior. For example, there is some evidence that
certain variations in the region of DNA that controls the production of
the neurotransmitter inhibitor MAO-A, when combined with particular
environmental stressors, are linked to violent behavior. 24
Our
21. Budowle & van Daal, supra note 5, at 604.
22. Gregory M. Cooper et al., Systematic Assessment of Copy Number Variant Detection Via
Genome-Wide SNP Genotyping, 40 NATURE GENETICS 1199 (2008); see also Stephen A. McCarroll,
Copy Number Variation and Human Genome Maps, 42 NATURE GENETICS 365 (2010).
23. See, e.g., Michael C. O’Donovan, Genetics of Psychosis; Insights from Views Across the
Genome, 126 HUM. GENETICS 3 (2009) (pointing to likely genetic indicators of schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder, but acknowledging that very little of the risk of either disorder can be explained
genetically).
24. See, e.g., H.G. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the
Structural Gene for Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 SCI. 578 (1993); Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of
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understanding of genetic contributions to behavior is nascent, but
behavioral genetics research will continue and may yield new
information.
DNA can reveal information about a person’s identity, genealogy, and
phenotype. Within these larger categories of genetic information is data
about a person’s ancestry, ethnicity, family relations, and medical risks.
Research has already begun on new frontiers of genetics, including
psychiatric and behavioral genetics. There are many human traits that
cannot currently be well explained by genetics, but our understanding of
the information contained in DNA will continue to improve.
B. Applying the Fourth Amendment to DNA Collection
The government is now collecting DNA from an increasingly large
number of people. DNA is taken from convicted felons in nearly every
state, 25 people arrested for certain offenses in twenty-one states, 26 crime
victims, and military personnel 27 to test for identification purposes. In
addition to testing for identity, DNA can be taken from suspects of
crimes to test for other purposes, like paternity.
Blood samples containing DNA are also taken from newborn babies 28
to test for treatable genetic diseases. This testing requires taking a small
amount of blood by pricking the newborn’s heel and collecting the blood
on paper cards, which, in most states, are destroyed after testing.
Newborns who have some detectable disorders, such as phenylketonuria,
can be treated to prevent or mitigate the disorder. 29

Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 SCI. 851 (2002); Guang Guo et al., The
VNTR 2 Repeat in MAOA and Delinquent Behavior in Adolescence and Young Adulthood: Associations
and MAOA Promoter Activity, 16 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 626 (2008); see also Nita Farahany &
William Bernet, Behavioural Genetics in Criminal Cases: Past, Present, and Future, 2 GENOMICS,
SOC’Y & POL’Y 72 (2006); Jill C. Schaefer, Profiling at the Cellular Level: The Future of the New York
State DNA Databanks, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 576 (2004) (“Currently a growing number of
scientists . . . are looking to the DNA strand as a predictor for criminality.”).
25. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws on DNA Data Banks,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12737 (last visited July 6, 2011) (listing forty-seven states that
collect DNA from all convicted felons).
26. Id. (listing twenty-one states that by 2009 had passed laws authorizing DNA samples of
certain arrestees).
27. Robert Scherer, Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the Fourth Amendment: The Need for a
New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEO. L.J. 2007 (1997).
28. In some states, blood spots are taken from newborn babies without consent of the parents in
order to screen for life-threatening medical conditions. The blood spots have been stored and used in
research. See, e.g., Emily Ramshaw, DSHS Turned Over Hundreds of DNA Samples to Feds, THE TEX.
TRIB., Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.texastribune.org/stories/2010/feb/22/dna-deception/#.
29. Susan Hiraki & Nancy Green, Newborn Screening for Treatable Genetic Conditions: Past,
Present and Future, 37 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 11 (2010).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/1

10

Lowenberg: APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN DNA COLLECTED FOR ONE PURPOSE
E-LOWENBERG

8/27/2011 4:34:19 PM

2011] APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO DNA

1299

In addition to these instances of DNA collection, the police have also
collected DNA from skin or saliva cells found on objects an individual
has discarded. In these circumstances, the government has argued that
there is no search or seizure, of the object or of the individual’s DNA,
because the person had no privacy interests in the abandoned property. 30
That argument raises interesting questions, but this Article will examine
only clear cut, frank government seizures of DNA, where the
government requires someone to provide a DNA sample. 31 That kind of
direct seizure implicates the right to be free from government intrusion
and is clearly a search and seizure. 32
Government collection of DNA is a search, but it has been found to
be a constitutional search under various Fourth Amendment tests. The
Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 33

The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prohibit the government
from conducting general, open-ended searches, whereby law
enforcement could search any individual for anything at any time. 34
The Fourth Amendment applies to government action that intrudes
upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 35
The
touchstone of whether the government can intrude upon that privacy is
“the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” 36 Courts have
developed several tests to determine whether a particular search is
reasonable. The applicable test depends on the circumstances of the
search.

30. Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 865 (2006).
31. In addition to “abandoned” DNA, the scope of this Article also excludes looking at
participants in government-funded research whose DNA is tested for additional information not
contemplated in the participant’s consent.
32. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement aims to prevent unnecessary, overly broad searches and arose out of
colonists’ abhorrence to general warrants that permitted “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s
belongings”).
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
36. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
19 (1968)).
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Ordinarily, in order for a search or seizure to be reasonable, the
government must obtain a search warrant. The Warrant Clause in the
Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to demonstrate to
a neutral magistrate that they have probable cause to believe that the
search will reveal particular evidence of a crime. As with any other type
of evidence, DNA can be collected pursuant to a warrant if police
officers demonstrate probable cause to a magistrate that the DNA will be
evidence of a crime. DNA warrants have been used to collect DNA
from suspects for testing for identification of a crime scene sample or for
showing paternity.
A warrant and probable cause are not always necessary for a search to
be reasonable. For example, if a person consents to being searched, then
nothing else—neither warrant nor probable cause—is necessary. Some
DNA collection would not be reasonable but for the consent exception.
For example, DNA has been collected by consent from many people
during DNA dragnets, in which police canvass areas near crime scenes
for possible suspects. 37
DNA can also be collected under certain circumstances without a
warrant because a person’s privacy expectation has decreased or the
government’s need is increased. 38 Searches of certain locations—such
as prisons or airport terminals 39 —and groups of people—such as
convicted felons—in which an otherwise legitimate expectation of
privacy is reduced need only be reasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances. The reasonableness of the search is evaluated “by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which the search intrudes upon
an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 40
Courts have used the totality of the circumstances test to uphold
collecting DNA from persons convicted of felonies because felons have

37. Jeffrey S. Grand, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2277, 2297–2302 (2002).
38. In addition to the totality of the circumstances and the special needs frameworks, searches to
enforce administrative codes or to accomplish important non-law enforcement goals may not require a
warrant. Administrative searches are less likely to permit DNA collection and analysis, so they are
beyond the scope of this Article. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–04 (1987) (noting that
warrantless inspection of premises of vehicle-dismantling company is reasonable because it is a “closely
regulated” business).
39. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1983) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.”); United States v. Edwards,
498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that warrantless airport security searches are reasonable in
light of the risk to human life and property so long as the search is conducted in good faith and with
reasonable scope and the passengers have advance notice).
40. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 843 (2006).
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a reduced expectation of privacy in their identity. 41 By this reasoning,
anyone convicted of a felony and either in prison or on conditional
release (the federal equivalent of parole) is “not entitled to the full
panoply of rights and protections possessed by the general public. Quite
to the contrary . . . those who have suffered a lawful conviction are
properly subject to a broad range of restrictions that might infringe
constitutional rights in free society . . . .” 42
Additionally, probable cause is not needed in searches to obtain
information for which the government has a special need beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, and adherence to the warrant-andprobable-cause requirement would be impracticable. For example, a
special non-law enforcement need is to protect public safety, which has
been used to justify drug testing railway workers in order to prevent
train accidents. 43 This is called the special needs test. This special
needs exception has also been used to justify collecting DNA from
convicted felons 44 and may justify collecting blood spots from
newborns. 45
Policies of taking DNA from arrested people who have not been
convicted face ongoing challenges. Twenty-one states and the federal
government allow law enforcement to collect DNA from a person after
he has been arrested for certain offenses, and this practice is likely to
spread. 46 New York is considering a new law that would require
collecting DNA samples from anyone convicted of any crime, including
low-level misdemeanors. 47 And in May 2010, the U.S. House of
41. The Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, a Seventh Circuit Judge, numerous federal district
courts, and a variety of state courts have applied the totality of the circumstances test to uphold DNA
testing of convicted felons. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004);
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680–81 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Groceman v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2004); Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th
Cir. 2003); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306–07 (4th Cir. 1992).
42. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 833 (internal quotations omitted).
43. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (allowing drug and alcohol
tests for railway employees to prevent accidents). See also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 685 (1989) (allowing drug tests for United States Customs Service employees who apply
to be in a position overseeing possible drug trafficking).
44. The Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, as well as some state supreme courts, have applied
the special needs doctrine to uphold DNA testing of convicted felons. See, e.g., Green, 354 F.3d at 679;
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79–82 (2d
Cir. 1999); State v. Martinez, 78 P.3d 769, 771–75 (Kan. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1085–
86 (Wash. 1993).
45. Most states allow parents to opt-out of the mandatory genetic testing, and courts have not yet
had occasion to review the constitutionality of the blood spot collection and testing. It has been posed
that the special needs exception would justify the collection if challenged. David H. Kaye et al., Is a
DNA Identification Database in Your Future?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 4, 10.
46. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 25.
47. Michael Virtanen, N.Y. Governor Pushes to Include Misdemeanor Offenders in DNA
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Representatives voted 357–32 to approve legislation to provide funding
to states that require DNA samples to be collected from arrestees.
Several cases challenge whether it is reasonable to collect DNA from
persons who are arrested 48 or released on bail, 49 but who have not been
convicted. In these cases, most courts have applied the totality of the
circumstances standard and found that an arrestee has no privacy interest
in their identity. 50 Some courts, however, have held that collecting
DNA from people who are arrested without a warrant violates the Fourth
Amendment, in part, because the collection of DNA implicates more
than identity. 51
Although courts have examined the legality of different types of
searches and seizures involved in collecting DNA, courts have not
discussed how the Fourth Amendment controls the manner in which
DNA can be analyzed after it is seized and initially analyzed. When the
legality of mandatory DNA collection is challenged, the courts are
“limited to resolving the constitutionality of the program before [them],
as it is designed and as it has been implemented.” 52 In reviewing the
programs immediately before them, courts in every circuit have upheld
analyzing DNA taken from convicted felons for the thirteen CODIS loci,
which is the standard practice in forensic DNA labs across the U.S.

Database, LAW.COM, June 23, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202462914709&rss=
newswire.
48. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 372 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding DNA
collection from arrestees), aff’d, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007); In re Welfare of C.T.L, 722 N.W.2d 484
(Minn. 2006) (finding that portions of a Minnesota statute that direct law-enforcement personnel to take
a biological specimen from a person who has been charged but not convicted violate the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-4718, 2011 WL 3086952 (3d Cir. July 25, 2011)
(holding that the federal DNA Act, by allowing the collection and testing of an arrestee’s DNA, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Purdy, No. 8:05CR204, 2005 WL 3465721 (D. Neb.
Dec. 19, 2005) (finding DNA collection without a warrant from arrestees unconstitutional); Haskell v.
Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (upholding DNA collection from arrestees).
49. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1223 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding DNA collection as a
condition of pretrial release), reh’g en banc granted, No. 09-10303, 2011 WL 2151202 (9th Cir. June 2,
2011).
50. Mitchell, 2011 WL 3086952 (upholding DNA collection from arrestees); Haskell, 677 F.
Supp. 2d at 1187 (upholding DNA collection from arrestees); Anderson, 634 S.E.2d at 375 (upholding
DNA collection from arrestees); Pool, 621 F.3d at 1223 (upholding DNA collection as a condition of
pretrial release).
51. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721 (finding DNA collection without a warrant from arrestees
unconstitutional); People v. Buza, No. A125542, 2011 WL 3338855, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4,
2011).
52. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 883 (9th Cir. 2004).
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C. Additional Tests Already Conducted, but Not Yet Judicially Evaluated
Although testing for the thirteen CODIS markers is the only testing
technique that has been explicitly vetted by the courts, in many states
DNA analysis already extends beyond this standard practice. Some
states are also testing stored DNA for information about familial
relationship or using it in medical and academic research. No court has
yet evaluated the constitutionality of these additional tests to determine
whether they are reasonable searches or whether they constitute searches
at all.
As mentioned above, in at least twelve states, law enforcement has
begun pulling stored tissue samples to conduct genetic testing at
additional DNA loci selected because they contain information about a
person’s family tree. 53 When comparing the DNA profiles from a
crime-scene sample to the profiles uploaded in a database, police
analysts may use a less stringent threshold for identifying matches. 54
Lower stringency tests may identify profiles that match some but not all
of the crime scene profile, which is likely when two people are related. 55
After police find a partial match in the database, they are permitted to
conduct additional genetic tests—usually Y-STR typing—on retained
tissue samples to confirm a familial tie. 56
When analysts make assumptions about familial relationships based
only on the thirteen CODIS loci, there are a large number of false
positives. 57 Conducting the additional Y-STR typing makes familial
matching policy more accurate. 58 Although Y-STR typing increases the
accuracy of familial matching and does not require any additional DNA
collection, the practice may not spread quickly because of the “potential
legal obstacles to retyping samples to generate Y-STR profiles.” 59
53. Y-STR typing is discussed supra p. 1294–95. See also Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties:
The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248 (2006).
54. Lower stringency comparisons allow police to identify matches even when the crime scene
sample is a mix of multiple persons’ DNA or when it is incomplete.
55. These partial matches that identify possible family members of would-be suspects occur
inadvertently when a police officer intends to find an exact match and requires no information beyond
what has already been searched and uploaded into the database. New York is the most recent state to
allow lab analysts to report these partial matches to law enforcement so the police can investigate those
leads. Press Release, John Caher, N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Forensic Science
Commission
Approves
“Partial-Match”
DNA
(June
4,
2009),
available
at
http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/press_releases/2009-06-04_pressrelease.html.
56. See Ram, supra note 17, at 754, 782; see, e.g., Press Release, Anderson, supra note 14
(describing policy for Y-STR typing in California).
57. See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV.
291, 292 (2010).
58. Id. at 315.
59. Id. at 343.
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No court has decided whether Y-STR typing is a Fourth Amendment
search or, if it is, whether it is a reasonable search. One could argue that
Y-STR typing is just a refinement of the initial search for identification,
using twenty-three STR loci instead of the common thirteen STR loci.
On the other hand, Y-STR typing is effective precisely because it reveals
more than identity; it reveals whether two men likely share a male
relative. And in conjunction with the level of similarity between those
two men’s thirteen CODIS markers, analysts can infer how closely those
two men are related.
Stored DNA samples are also being accessed and tested for medical
research. In Alabama, the same statute that requires DNA be taken from
convicted felons also explicitly authorizes the analysis of that DNA to
aid in medical research. 60 Michigan also authorizes the use of its law
enforcement DNA database for academic and research purposes. 61
In addition to DNA taken through the criminal justice system, DNA
taken from newborns has also been used for medical research without
the parents’ knowledge or consent. As mentioned previously, all states
require that newborns be screened for genetic diseases by collecting a
small amount of blood on a paper card. 62 In Texas and Minnesota,
without notifying the parents that the blood spots would be stored
indefinitely, these blood spots have been stripped of identifying
information to the extent possible and lent to medical and forensic
research projects. 63
Parents in both Texas and Minnesota brought lawsuits in federal court
against the states alleging that the additional testing done on their
newborn’s DNA violated their children’s Fourth Amendment rights, but
neither of these lawsuits provided clear answers on whether the
additional testing is a Fourth Amendment search. In Minnesota, the
plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim did not survive the motion to
dismiss because the district court found they had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. 64 In contrast, the Texas plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment claim survived a motion to dismiss; the district court
judge found that the plaintiffs had pleaded enough facts to state a

60. ALA. CODE 1975 § 36-18-20(j) (2010).
61. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.176(d) (2010).
62. Hiraki & Green, supra note 29.
63. Letter from Eldridge T. Hutcheson, Laboratory Operations Unit, Tex. Dept. of State Health
Servs. to Thomas Parsons, Chief Scientist, Armed Forces DNA Identification Lab. (Mar. 7, 2005),
available at http://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/DSHS_Letter_To_Feds.pdf.
64. Bearder v. State, No. 27-CV-09-5615, slip op. at 11 (Minn. D. Ct. Nov. 24, 2009), aff’d, 788
N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, No. A10-101, 2010 Minn. LEXIS 709 (Minn. Nov.
16, 2010).
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plausible claim under the Fourth Amendment. 65 Ultimately, the case
settled and the state government agreed to destroy more than five
million remaining blood spot cards. 66 Neither of these cases was fully
adjudicated, and the cases provide no guidance about whether the
additional medical analysis of the DNA samples was a new Fourth
Amendment search.
These practices demonstrate that although DNA is collected initially
for a particular purpose, as long as the government retains it, the sample
might be subject to additional analyses, revealing other personal
information. Apart from constitutional protections, some additional
analyses of the DNA are prohibited by statute and internal law
enforcement rules, which differ from state to state. 67 These statutes and
rules, however, may change over time to allow other constitutionally
permissible DNA testing.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH LIMITING DNA SEARCHES ONLY AT THE TIME OF
COLLECTION
As the law currently stands, it is unclear whether there are any limits
to what the government may do with DNA once it is legally collected
and partially analyzed. State governments are already analyzing stored
DNA samples for new purposes. It is possible that some courts might
not see any role for the Fourth Amendment in regulating these new
analyses of DNA that has already been collected. These courts might
follow the reasoning of Justice Scalia in his dissent in Ferguson v. City
of Charleston that the taking and drug testing of urine presented “only
one act that could conceivably be regarded as a search . . . : the taking of
the urine sample.” 68
If the Fourth Amendment has no role in protecting DNA after it has
been collected, then the worries voiced by plaintiffs and amici in United
States v. Kincade, and by many opponents of warrantless DNA
collection, may be realized. “It is inevitable that as technology
advances, at some point, [DNA samples] will be used for other purposes
65. Beleno v. Lakey, No. 5:09-CV-00188-FB, slip op. at 15 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2009),
dismissed per stipulation (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009).
66. Jay Root, Texas Officials Agree to Destroy Babies’ Blood Samples After Settling Lawsuit,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14, 2010, available at http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/?p=1822.
67. Compare ALA. CODE 1975 § 13-18-31 (2010) (allowing for medical research uses), with
CAL. PENAL CODE § 295.1(a) (West 2010) (limiting DNA analysis to identification), and S.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-3-610 (2010) (permitting law enforcement, non-law enforcement, and humanitarian
purposes). See also Press Release, Anderson, supra note 14 (codifying Y-STR typing protocol for
familial searching).
68. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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without the consent or knowledge of the individual tested.” 69 And
“soon, if not already, scientists will request access to what would serve
as [a] preexisting goldmine of DNA data for their research.” 70
In Kincade, although the majority acknowledged these concerns were
“weighty ones” and did “not dismiss them lightly,” they specifically
declined to address how the Fourth Amendment would apply if those
analyses became reality; that issue remains unresolved. 71 In order to
prevent these future analyses, Judge Reinhardt argued that DNA
collection should not be permitted because “[i]t is better to keep the wolf
out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall
have entered.” 72 Now that the constitutionality of DNA collection has
been upheld in many circumstances and the proverbial wolf has been let
in, is he permitted to bite?
If the only act that could be regarded as a search were the taking of
DNA from a person’s body and its initial analysis, a large amount of
genetic information would be unprotected. Although limiting the initial
government intrusion and collection of evidence is sufficient to protect a
person’s expectation of privacy in many searches, DNA is distinct from
other types of seized materials in ways that make applying Fourth
Amendment law more complicated. Specifically, genetic information is
intermingled, and the government will be unable to avoid seizing
irrelevant, private information with sought-after evidence. As a result,
particularity will not be able to precisely limit what information can be
seized. Additionally, the intermingled genetic information will be
stored, sometimes indefinitely, after its initial analysis, making it
available for future testing and amplifying the risk of any gaps in Fourth
Amendment protection.
A. Intermingled Information and Particularity
Typically when police conduct a search, they are permitted only to
seize particular material. If a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant,
then the warrant must state the particular location to be searched and the
particular items to be seized; this specificity is called the particularity
requirement. 73 When a search is conducted pursuant to an exception to
69. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 n.33 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Brief of Amicus
Curiae Protection & Advocacy, Inc.).
70. Id. (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Information Privacy Center).
71. Id. at 837.
72. Id. at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 121 (William Peden ed., 1955)).
73. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that warrants shall
particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/1

18

Lowenberg: APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN DNA COLLECTED FOR ONE PURPOSE
E-LOWENBERG

8/27/2011 4:34:19 PM

2011] APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO DNA

1307

the warrant requirement, there is no formal particularity requirement, but
the circumstances of the exception similarly limit what police may seize.
By allowing the police to search for and seize only particular
evidence, the Fourth Amendment limits the extent of the police intrusion
into the individual’s privacy. For example, when police enter a home to
seize a particular piece of evidence, such as a gun, the police may only
search for that gun. 74 It is a one-step process that is limited with respect
to time, and it ends when the gun is located and seized. Although some
additional testing of the gun could be performed, the analysis of the gun
could not reveal much information beyond the information immediately
relevant to an investigation.
Searching DNA, however, always requires a two-step process: first,
searching for and seizing the specimen, and second, extracting the
information contained in the specimen. The genetic information in
DNA must be analyzed in a laboratory to yield the sought-after evidence
and could also reveal a large amount of information unrelated to the
crime. Because the DNA specimen contains a large amount of data and
testing cannot occur at the time of the initial seizure, the police will need
to seize the specimen.
Consequently, despite the particularity
requirement, the police must seize information in which they have no
interest because that information is intermingled with the criminally
relevant information in the specimen. 75
B. Retained Indefinitely and Future Technology
Usually, the specimen containing the DNA will be stored, sometimes
indefinitely, after its initial analysis, making it available for future
testing and amplifying the risk of any gaps in Fourth Amendment
protection. Typically, when police have lawfully seized material but
that material no longer serves any state interest (often because the
investigation or trial has ended or the property was not useful evidence),
an individual can move under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure to have the property returned. 76 Rule 41(g) allows
“[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or
the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”).
74. If, however, during a reasonable search, police inadvertently discover anything that is
immediately apparent to be evidence or contraband, they may seize that additional evidence or
contraband under the plain view exception. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (applying
“plain view” doctrine to evaluate police officer’s moving stereo equipment to read its serial numbers).
75. Of course, the problem of intermingled information is not limited to DNA. As discussed
infra at p. 1312, courts have addressed this issue with respect to intermingled papers and computer files.
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) advisory committee’s notes on 1989 amendments.
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by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return.” 77
The rule requires federal law enforcement to return property that is no
longer needed by law enforcement to its owner (unless it is contraband
or an instrumentality of a crime), even when that property was seized
legally.
Requiring a DNA sample to be returned after it has been analyzed for
its evidentiary purpose is not as simple. In May 2010, the Ninth Circuit
remanded a case, United States v. Kriesel, to a district court in the
Western District of Washington to determine whether a former
supervised releasee can move under Rule 41(g) to have his DNA sample
returned. 78 In this case, Kriesel had provided six drops of blood to a
United States Probation Officer, which were sent to the FBI. The FBI
used three of these drops of blood to create Kriesel’s CODIS profile and
stored them in a controlled access storage area. The FBI stored the other
three drops of blood in a controlled-access freezer. 79 Kriesel moved
under Rule 41(g) to get his blood back. 80
On July 21, 2011, the district court denied Kriesel’s motion and held
that
Kriesel’s blood sample is property within the meaning of Rule 41. The
Government needed to show it had a legitimate reason for retaining the
blood sample to defeat Kriesel’s Rule 41(g) Motion. Maintaining
CODIS’ integrity is a legitimate reason for the Government to retain
Kriesel’s blood sample. The Government needs to retain [the three drops
of blood that had been analyzed] for quality assurance and needs to retain
[the three drops of blood that had not been analyzed] as backup to
CODIS.
This Court refuses to order the return of the blood sample because the
blood was collected for a lawful statutory purpose, Kriesel’s claimed
harm is speculative, and Rule 41(g) was not meant to resolve policy
disputes such as this one. 81

As Kriesel demonstrates, a motion to return a DNA sample under
Rule 41(g) may be frustrated for a number of reasons. A person is not
harmed by the deprivation of the use of their seized DNA sample in the
same way one is harmed by the deprivation of property like an overcoat.
Thus, the moving individual’s claim will likely always be “an extremely
speculative claim for the return of property with no economic value, and
the return of this property would upset a law enforcement system
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (emphasis added).
United States v. Kriesel, 604 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Kriesel, No. 03-05258, slip op. at 3–4 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 2011).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 13–14.
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authorized by Congress.” 82 Courts therefore will be unlikely to order
the return of a lawfully collected DNA sample if doing so would
“disrupt CODIS with an inconspicuous rule of criminal procedure.” 83
In addition to allowing the collection of DNA, many DNA statutes
expressly indicate that the government has a continuing interest in
retaining DNA samples. Currently, the federal government and many
states retain DNA samples collected for law enforcement or another
purpose—not just the personal identification profiles, but the actual
specimens. 84 Approximately twenty-eight states have DNA database
statutes that do not mention whether the samples should be stored or
destroyed. 85 At least six states require samples be retained between
thirty-five years and indefinitely 86 and have some restrictions on how
the unused samples can be tested. 87 Approximately, thirteen states set
up procedures whereby samples may be retained but do not explicitly
require it. 88 By contrast, Wisconsin requires all samples be destroyed
after DNA analysis is performed. 89 The justification for retaining these
samples is to ensure that samples can be reexamined for quality
assurance and for retesting when new technologies improve DNA
identification analyses. 90
Storing the samples, however, increases the possibility that they will
be tested to reveal more information about a person than was

82. Id. at 13.
83. Id.
84. The European Court of Human Rights held that storing the DNA of unconvicted people
violates European privacy guarantees. S. v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, ¶ 134
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 4, 2008). Many legal scholars, even those in favor of expansion of DNA collection,
have suggested that the United States’ genetic privacy issues would be greatly reduced by similarly
destroying the DNA samples after they are tested. See, e.g., D. H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA
Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS.
L. REV. 413, 438.
85. This number is based on a survey of state statutes performed in 2004 and, thus, is only
approximate. SETH AXELRAD, AM. SOC’Y OF LAW, MED. & ETHICS, SURVEY OF STATE DNA
DATABASE STATUTES (2004), available at http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/guide.pdf.
86. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4105(4) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(H)(3) (West
2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102i (a) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-62 (West 2010); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.4 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-18 (West 2011); see also AXELRAD,
supra note 85.
87. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4105(3) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(I) (West 2011);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102i (a) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-62 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-310.4 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-18 (West 2011).
88. See supra note 85.
89. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.77(2)(a)2 (2010).
90. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE
OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 24
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf.
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contemplated when the sample was originally seized. 91 DNA that is
reasonably collected today, given what testing can currently reveal and
how it is now being used, will still be in the custody of law enforcement
when advances in technology make DNA more informative. Storing the
samples also increases the risk that they could be analyzed for
illegitimate purposes currently prohibited by state laws, such as testing
for disease risk or selling the information to insurance providers. 92
Although the laws vary from state to state, most states allow only
persons whose convictions have been overturned or who were never
convicted to petition to have their samples destroyed and profile
expunged, leaving anyone who is convicted without opportunity to have
her sample destroyed. 93 Any risk to privacy presented by gaps in Fourth
Amendment protection for DNA analysis is made more serious because,
in contrast to other types of seized materials that no longer serve an
evidentiary purpose, the government can store DNA indefinitely.
C. Large Volume of Private Information in a Small Space
Because each DNA sample contains a large volume of information
and the sample can be retained by the government, it is important to
determine what protectable privacy interests remain after the sample has
been initially tested. Once material has been searched, privacy interests
in the material are extinguished. For example, if police are permitted to
open and search a closed container, they may look at anything inside
that container. 94 Its contents are exposed, and searching those contents
more thoroughly does not expand the scope of the search. 95 The zone of
the search extends to anything within the container’s walls. If
91. See discussion of Y-STR typing supra p. 1294–95.
92. One article has suggested that these ex-felons could instead “convince the courts to grant
them injunctive relief in the form of a bar on any further DNA analysis given the lack of reasonableness
of the search.” Jason Tarricone, “An Ordinary Citizen Just Like Everyone Else”: The Indefinite
Retention of Former Offenders’ DNA, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 209, 245 (2005).
93. Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement:
What Role For Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 158 (2006).
94. United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that federal agents’
search of box and videotapes found therein, where the box had been opened by employees of private
shipper, did not exceed the scope of prior private searches for Fourth Amendment purposes simply
because the federal agents took more time and were more thorough than the shipper’s agents). See also
United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2001). Contra United States v. Rouse, 148
F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that, while law enforcement agents could seize multiple
identification cards already discovered during a private search by airline officials, seizing a laminating
machine and materials in the same bag that were not discovered by the airline officials or in plain sight
violated the Fourth Amendment, because the defendant’s expectations of privacy had not already been
extinguished).
95. Simpson, 904 F.2d at 610.
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something is contained in a different, closed container, then it remains
private, and opening the container intrudes upon new privacy interests.
Constitutional protections will apply to prohibit additional analyses of
specimens only if a reasonable expectation of privacy remains in
material that has been partially, lawfully analyzed.
As already described, DNA contains a large amount of information
about identity, genealogy, and phenotypic traits. All this information is
contained in each nucleus of every one of our bodies’ cells. As
technology advances, more meaningful information will be extractable
from that genetic material. While the size of the space being searched
predictably limits the amount of information stored in a room within a
house or a container, the only practical limit on information that can be
extracted from biological samples are currently-available analysis
techniques and our knowledge of what genetic variations mean.
Additionally, a person typically knows what she has brought into her
house and stored there, but a person has no reason to know much of the
information that will be revealed when her DNA is analyzed. 96 A
person has little to no discretion over what information is stored in her
body and likely has not analyzed or evaluated that information herself.
A person’s privacy in the contents of each microscopic bundle of DNA
should be more stringently protected because of the unpredictability and
density of the genetic information it contains.
It must be determined whether, and in what, a reasonable expectation
of privacy remains after any laboratory analysis of specimens collected
for DNA information has been conducted. To what extent does
permitting a search for some information extinguish the privacy in all
the information contained in a biological sample?
III. DIGITAL COMPARISON AND HOW TO LIMIT DNA ANALYSIS
Differences exist between applying Fourth Amendment protection to
laboratory analysis and to more traditionally protected contexts. But
under the logic of the Fourth Amendment, an individual’s privacy
interest in her genetic information should be constitutionally protected.
Recently, in evaluating whether collecting DNA from an arrestee
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Third Circuit reasoned that “[t]he
collection of DNA . . . entails two separate ‘searches.’ The first is the
physical collection of the DNA sample.” 97 “The second ‘search’ at
issue is, of course, the processing of the DNA sample and creation of the
96. Some of the genetic information would be known. For example, one would expect DNA to
show one’s sex and some inherited traits.
97. United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-4718, 2011 WL 3086952, at *17 (3d Cir. July 25, 2011).
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DNA profile for CODIS. This search also has the potential to infringe
upon privacy interests.” 98 Thus, the court made clear that the initial
DNA testing is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 99
But the question remains whether a second or third analysis of that
same specimen would require Fourth Amendment scrutiny. To answer
this question, we must consider “the relatively undeveloped and critical
issue of whether, sometimes, the mining of information from materials
already in the government’s possession might constitute the invasion of
a reasonable expectation of privacy.“ 100
Given the characteristics of DNA discussed above, principles that
define the scope of a search by limiting the initial intrusion at the time of
collection are insufficient to limit the scope of DNA analyses, which
allow a large amount of personal information to be tested long after the
DNA is collected. In order to apply Fourth Amendment principles in a
way that better suits DNA analysis, we should examine how courts have
applied constitutional limits to other technologically-advanced searches
that present similar complications and extend that reasoning to DNA.
Thus, this Article looks to a non-biological area of technology law in
which the issue of how to define the zone of a search in an informationrich context that may be subject to subsequent analyses has been more
thoroughly explored: government searches of computers.
Computers and DNA share characteristics that distinguish both from
more traditionally protected zones of privacy. They both store a large
amount of intermingled information in a small space that cannot be
parsed at the time of collection. Cases challenging novel and broad
searches of computers have given courts the opportunity to thoroughly
analyze how the Fourth Amendment applies in this type of
technologically advanced context.
Computer-search law is not wholly different from the law addressing
more traditional searches. Rather, the benefit of computer-search law is
that it develops analogies by which to extend traditional Fourth
Amendment principles to a challenging new context. These computer
cases are the best indicators of how courts may apply constitutional rules
to the different ways in which DNA can be analyzed. Computer-search
law is not uniform across jurisdictions. Different courts have applied the
98. Id. at *18.
99. Similarly, several cases that evaluated mandatory drug-testing have held that chemical
laboratory analysis of urine specimens is an invasion of privacy warranting Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652
(1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
100. Sherry F. Colb, Does Routinely Sampling DNA from Arrested Felons Violate the Fourth
Amendment?, FINDLAW, Nov. 10, 2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20101110.html.
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Fourth Amendment in different ways to limit searches of computers.
Comparing different approaches to regulating computer searches
provides interesting parallels to regulating DNA analysis; these parallels
are predictive of how courts are likely to evaluate the reasonableness of
new DNA analyses and create the basis for this Article’s
recommendations on which rules courts should apply.
By examining the emerging law on computer searches, it is possible
to identify effective and doctrinally-supported approaches to striking the
appropriate Fourth Amendment balance between protecting individuals’
genetic privacy and ensuring that the government can collect valuable
DNA evidence and information. The optimal rules are ones that
interpret the Fourth Amendment to require a warrant or warrant
exception before running additional tests on the DNA.
A. Zone of Computer Searches: Physical-Device or Virtual-File
First, this Article looks at how courts have defined the zone of a
computer search and what that indicates for defining the zone of a DNA
search. As mentioned above, once material has been searched, privacy
interests in the material are extinguished. The material can be searched
again more thoroughly, without any justification required. Looking at
something that falls within the zone of the initial search is not a new
Fourth Amendment action. If something is outside the zone of the initial
search, however, it remains vested with its original expectation of
privacy, and searching that material must be justified and reasonable.
In many searches, determining the zone of what has already been
searched is simple: when police open a container, everything in that
container is within the zone of the search. Traditionally, Fourth
Amendment law has focused on whether it is reasonable to penetrate the
boundaries of a physical space. Once those boundaries are penetrated,
privacy in that zone is extinguished. Determining what expectations of
privacy have already been compromised by an initial search is more
difficult when there are no physical walls to define the zone of that
search. To extend this principle to laboratory searches, one must define
what privacy interests are compromised when a search is conducted in a
much smaller space, like the inside of a hard drive or a human cell. This
inquiry is critical to determining what information remains private after
police have analyzed some information in a computer or for that matter a
DNA sample.
As Orin Kerr explains in Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,
courts have used two different bases for defining the zone of a search
and determining what remains private after a computer search begins:
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(1) the boundaries of the physical device, and (2) the effort necessary to
open another file. 101
The “physical device approach” 102 to defining what privacy interests
remain after a search has been adopted in some cases that involve
searches of digital information stored on a computer. Some digital
search cases have held that physical parts of a computer device
constitute containers that hold information, which ceases to be private
once the container is opened. 103 For example, in United States v.
Runyan, 104 the Fifth Circuit compared a disk containing multiple files to
a single container and found that no privacy interest remained in a disk
once some of its contents had been viewed: thus, all other files on that
disk could be opened. Regarding the unopened disks, the court found
privacy rights to be intact and held unlawful a warrantless search of such
disks.
In United States v. Crist, 105 a federal district court adopted this
approach when determining whether a hard drive is analogous to a
single closed container. In Crist, the court concluded that a hard drive is
not a single closed container, but the individual platters or magnetic data
storage units that are mounted together to compose a hard drive are
analogous to the disks in Runyan. 106 Both of these cases involved an
initial search conducted by a private person and a second search
conducted by the police. The Runyan and Crist courts reasoned that the
physical boundaries of the device defined what information remained
private after the initial private search and what could be searched more
thoroughly during the second search.
Other digital search cases have moved away from this more
traditional focus on whether physical walls have been penetrated and
instead focus on the content of what has been revealed. These cases peg
the contours of the search to a “virtual file approach.” 107 These cases
treat individual files as separate containers, whereby the opening of each
file must be justified. 108 In United States v. Carey, 109 the Tenth Circuit
101. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 554–56
(2005) (describing the “physical device approach” and the “virtual file approach”).
102. Id. at 554.
103. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that the initial
private search extinguished a reasonable expectation of privacy in the disk that was searched but not in
other disks that were also turned over to police by the private party).
104. Id.
105. United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
106. Id. at 586.
107. Kerr, supra note 101, at 555 (discussing the “virtual file approach”).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
109. Id.
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held that a warrant granting access to the defendant’s computer to search
for files containing evidence of drug trafficking did not allow police to
open other files to instead look for evidence of child pornography.
Opening additional files expanded the search and violated distinct
privacy rights.
Even more restrictive, Judge Bea’s concurring opinion in United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, a recent Ninth Circuit case,
considers only the information made visible on the screen as being
searched, requiring there to be a separate justification for moving the
scroll bar to the right and thereby exposing more information. 110 Judge
Bea distinguishes the zone of what has been searched not by the file, but
by what data is exposed on the screen. This reasoning aligns with Orin
Kerr’s argument that the zone of a computer search “should be whatever
information appears on the output device” explaining that this comports
with the virtual file approach because “an analyst who takes a mouse,
clicks, pulls down the file to see other parts of the file not previously
exposed has done nothing different from another analyst who double
clicks on a second file to open it. . . . Both actions should be treated as
searches.” 111
Cases that separate privacy interests by individual files or screen shots
do not rely on the physical boundaries of a device. Rather, these cases
rely on the content, specifically what information has actually been
exposed to the analyst to define the zone of a search. In these cases,
opening a new file or moving a scroll bar is similar to opening a new
container because they require the investigator to perform an additional
step that exposes new information. These cases signal a shift in Fourth
Amendment law away from relying solely on the form of the search—
what area may be penetrated—toward a focus on the content of the
search—what information will be revealed.
Both of these rationales are workable when applied to computers. It
takes work to analogize between closed containers and computers, and
the physical boundaries approach may seem strained when comparing
computer disks or platters to containers. DNA, however, is even one
step more removed, and in that context, the physical boundaries
approach breaks down altogether.

110. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), revised and superseded by 621 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
111. Kerr, supra note 101, at 557.
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B. Zone of a DNA Search: Physical Specimen
Borrowing from computer law, there are two ways in which courts
may define the zone of a DNA analysis: the “physical specimen”
approach or the “exposed information” approach. For both normative
and doctrinal reasons, the exposed information approach to defining the
zone of a DNA analysis is the far better approach.
1. Description of the Physical Specimen Approach
The physical specimen approach is the parallel to the “physical
device” approach used by the Fifth Circuit in Runyan, whereby once a
hard drive or disk has been accessed, the entire device has been searched
and privacy interests in everything else contained on that device are
extinguished. The physical specimen approach relies on the same
underlying principle as the “physical device” approach that the tangible
boundaries of the material define the zone of a search.
The physical specimen approach does nothing to protect a person’s
genetic privacy after the initial DNA analysis is performed. If one were
to define the specimen itself as a single closed container, similar to
treating a disk as a single container as the court did in Runyan, 112 then
everything contained in the sample is no longer private and can be
viewed or searched. For example, consider a blood sample collected by
police in order to match DNA to a crime scene sample. If one analysis
compromises the expectation of privacy of everything in the sample,
then the blood sample could also be tested for blood alcohol content, the
presence of narcotics, or chromosomal abnormalities linked to disease
risk.
There are, of course, smaller physical boundaries within a specimen;
this mode of analysis is similar to that of the Crist court, 113 which
identified the platters instead of the entire hard drive as the appropriate
container of digital information, that could be used to construct the
metaphorical container walls. But even if the physical boundaries were
limited to the membrane around a single nucleus in a single cell, the
person’s entire library of DNA would be subject to analysis.
Under the physical specimen approach, additional analyses could be
performed on any tested and retained DNA sample. Already, some
DNA collected for identification and medical screening purposes is used
112. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458, 461–64 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding the zone of the
search was defined by the individual diskettes, and each diskette was equivalent to a closed container).
113. United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 586 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (holding the zone of the
search was defined by the individual platters in a hard drive).
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for research analyses. Law enforcement is also analyzing DNA, which
was originally collected for identification, to show familial relationships.
In the future, this familial searching might be done on DNA taken from
arrestees, crime victims, former suspects, military personnel, or
newborns, all of which might aid in identifying the true perpetrator.
Additionally, the government may want to expand the CODIS database
by analyzing DNA, originally taken from newborns for medical
screening, for identification or familial relationship, in the same way that
a convicted person’s DNA is analyzed now. Alternatively, in an effort
to prosecute statutory rapists or to facilitate the collection of child
support, the government might analyze stored DNA for evidence of
paternity. In a more far-fetched scenario, if research on behavioral or
psychiatric phenotype yields useful information, these stored DNA
samples may someday be tested to produce genetic character evidence or
to determine a person’s legal mental health status for purposes of
competency, commitment, sentencing, or benefits eligibility.
2. Related Harms
Without regulation of what tests can be done, individuals whose DNA
has been collected will be open to privacy harms. In addition to the
dignitary harm done by having personal information exposed, the
genetic information yielded from the additional tests or general
protocols discussed above—identity, paternity, other familial
relationships, ancestry, disease risk, and behavioral propensities—could
have negative consequences for the individual. If a person’s genetic
identification profile is created, that person can be implicated in future
crimes and will constantly be compared to crime scene DNA samples,
which some have referred to as lifelong “genetic surveillance.” 114 Also,
if DNA is subject to familial searching, to reveal other family
relationships, the individual may feel responsible for making his entire
family subject to such genetic surveillance. Furthermore, if a family
member were to be subsequently prosecuted for a crime, that individual
could feel responsible for implicating their family member.
Information about paternity could be used as evidence of statutory
rape if the mother of the child is underage or as evidence in a civil case
to require the father to pay child support. Aside from the legal setting,
evidence of paternity could also give the child a claim for inheritance or
disrupt the father’s existing family if he was not previously aware of the
child. Additionally, government-conducted paternity testing could harm
114. Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.slate.com/
id/2213958.
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the mother if it keeps a man involved in her life whom she had hoped to
avoid.
Additionally, if a person’s DNA is made available for research, a
person may be unwillingly supporting research she opposes. For
example, some groups of people have declined to participate in genetic
ancestry research that might contradict their beliefs about their own
ancestry. Recently, members of the Havasupai tribe in Arizona brought
a lawsuit against Arizona State University for genetic research
conducted without their consent, which indicated that the tribe had
Asian ancestry in contradiction to the tribe’s traditional stories about its
origin. 115 A person whose DNA is taken and later used in research will
have no say over the type of research conducted, the results of which
may affect how she understands herself.
The phenotypic information revealed by genetic testing could also
harm a person if disclosed, although some of these harms are speculative
and contingent on advances in medical, behavioral, and psychiatric
research that have not yet been realized. Genetic testing for disease risk,
if shared with insurers, could result in a person being denied life
insurance, disability insurance, or long-term care insurance. 116 If
disclosed to the person, who would not have wanted to know, it could
change the person’s plans in an undesired way. 117 If a person is
revealed to have a gene associated with a psychiatric disorder, it might
support a finding that the person should be institutionalized or is
incompetent. On the other hand, if a person claiming to have a
psychiatric disorder for mitigating a criminal sentence or to receive
government benefits is found not to have a strongly associated gene, that
information might be used to counter the person’s claims. Lastly, and
most speculatively, information about whether a person has a gene
variant associated with behavior, for example violent behavior, might be
used to direct an investigation or to predict recidivism for sentencing 118
and parole decisions.
Basing Fourth Amendment protection on the spatial boundaries of a
DNA specimen would allow unchecked DNA analysis and would have
115. Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of its DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2010, at A1.
116. None of these are affected by the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”).
Mark A. Rothstein, Putting the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in Context, 10 GENETICS IN
MEDICINE 655, 655 (2008).
117. See, e.g., R. Adorno, The Right Not To Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED.
ETHICS 435 (2004) (arguing that people have an interest in not knowing their genetic make up to avoid
serious psychological consequences).
118. See Emiliano Feresin, Lighter Sentence for Murderers with ‘Bad Genes,’ NATURE NEWS,
Oct. 30, 2009, http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091030/full/news.2009.1050.html.
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real consequences for the people whose DNA has been collected.
Instead, a more content-focused approach would regulate when
additional analyses can take place and how those analyses should be
conducted.
C. Zone of a DNA Search: Exposed Information
The exposed information approach is similar to the “virtual file”
approach used by the Tenth Circuit in Carey, 119 whereby only the
privacy interests in an opened file have been extinguished. If additional
effort would be required to open a new file or expose new information
within a file, then that information has not yet been searched and retains
its original privacy protections. 120 The additional step necessary to open
a new file distinguishes it from what has already been searched, and the
same could be true of the additional step necessary to reveal new genetic
information; the exposed information approach generalizes this principle
to other non-computer contexts.
1. Description of the Exposed Information Approach
Defining the zone of a search based on the exposed information
approach is more protective of an individual’s privacy. Under this
approach, even after some analysis has been done, additional analyses
that reveal new information would impinge on the remaining reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sample. Analysis that exposes information
inside of the physical boundaries of a biological sample or a single cell
would not eliminate privacy interests in other information that cell can
reveal. Each analysis is an incremental effort that exposes private
information, similar to opening a new container, which must be
reasonable and justified.
To illustrate the privacy differences between these two approaches,
consider a hypothetical posed by three professors in a 2001 article. 121
The article suggested that blood spots taken to test newborns for
treatable genetic diseases could also be genotyped at the CODIS markers
in order to build a more universal DNA database for criminal law
enforcement identification. Taking the newborn blood spots would be
justified, as a special needs search, with a primary purpose that has
119. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that opening a new
file exposed information outside the zone of what had already been searched).
120. See also Orin Kerr’s discussion of the “exposed data” approach to defining the zone of a
search. Kerr, supra note 101, at 556.
121. Kaye et al., supra note 45, at 10.
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nothing to do with normal law enforcement. The article argued that
identification analysis could piggyback on top of that genetic screening,
even though it is useful only for future identification, as a secondary
purpose of the same DNA search. This argument conceives of the DNA
analysis as a single search with two purposes. Under the physical
specimen approach, that analysis would be correct; both of these
analyses would be part of the same search. Under the exposed
information approach, however, testing for the CODIS markers would
be an additional search because it requires steps which expose new
information, the steps necessary to genotype those loci.
In addition to protecting privacy, the exposed information approach
also allows the government to more easily justify collecting DNA. If a
physical specimen approach were adopted, any DNA collection could be
challenged because it leaves all of a person’s genetic information
vulnerable to later searches. The exposed information approach,
however, assuages these concerns by requiring that analysis of new
information in DNA must be independently reasonable and justified and
must pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
The exposed information approach is also better supported by case
law than the physical specimen approach. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 122 the Supreme Court held that certain laboratory tests on a
biological specimen were unreasonable even though the specimen was
previously tested for another purpose. In Ferguson, a governmentfunded hospital had instituted a program in which urine samples
collected from certain pregnant patients for medical testing were also
tested for the presence of cocaine. If the samples tested positive for
narcotics, the hospital reported their findings to the police. The Court
held that the additional laboratory testing violated the Fourth
Amendment. 123
The Court recognized that patients retain a privacy interest in
information in their urine samples even after consenting to other tests.
Their consent prescribed the parameters of what searches could be done.
Therefore, if the patients consented only to medical testing related to
pregnancy, then that is the extent of what could be searched for. 124
Testing for drug use was an additional step that exposed new
information and thus constituted a new search. Unless the patients had

122. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (involving the testing of plaintiffs’ urine
for evidence of drug use when it was originally taken to test for medical information).
123. Id. at 86.
124. The consent serves the same purpose here as the particularity requirement in a search
pursuant to a warrant.
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consented to the drug testing, 125 it constituted an unconsented to, and in
this case, unreasonable search.
The Court’s reasoning is better captured by the exposed information
approach than the physical specimen approach. The principle that
connects Ferguson to Carey is that any incremental effort that exposes
new information is a new Fourth Amendment moment. If one must take
an additional step to expose evidence, then that evidence, axiomatically,
was not already searched, and the privacy interest in it is retained.126
2. Comparative Advantages
Applying the exposed information approach to preserving privacy
interests in DNA, it appears that each analysis that provides new results
is a search. Although police may have already conducted some tests on
a specimen, that analysis does not diminish expectations of privacy in
unrevealed information. Furthermore, although that specimen is
lawfully in police custody and might be indefinitely retained, the
individual’s expectation of privacy in its contents is not diminished by
that seizure or retention. Additional analyses on biological samples
must be reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards, either falling
within the scope of the original search or being an independently
justifiable search.
Thus, let us apply this standard to Y-STR familial search programs.
As detailed above, under this program, if analysts find a partial match
between a crime scene DNA sample and a known DNA profile, the
stored DNA sample for that known DNA profile will be genotyped at
ten additional locations on the Y chromosome to determine whether the
crime scene DNA came from that person’s close male relative. This YSTR typing, instead of stopping at the thirteen CODIS loci, is a step that
exposes new information and therefore is an additional search triggering
a Fourth Amendment analysis. Although on its own, Y-STR genotyping
only reveals whether two men share a common patrilineal ancestor, in
conjunction with the thirteen autosomal CODIS markers, these Y-STR
loci can indicate how closely related the two men are. These additional
steps that reveal new information constitute a new search requiring
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
The legal question of how to define the zone of a search determines
125. On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that none of the patients had
consented to drug testing. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395, 404 (4th Cir. 2002).
126. See also United States v. Lemmons, 282 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating, in dicta,
that a computer file is not in plain sight when an agent must enter commands into the computer to access
the file).
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only whether a new search has occurred, not whether that new search is
reasonable. Such a search must be reasonable in its own right. Whether
the Y-STR typing search is reasonable depends on how strong those
privacy interests are and the government’s need for the information.
Sometimes these additional analyses will be reasonable without a
warrant. For example, although no court has yet reviewed it, Y-STR
familial searching programs involving DNA from convicted persons
would very likely be found reasonable, especially if Y-STR typing is
only performed on specimens that, based on the CODIS loci, were very
likely to yield a familial match. If a convicted person’s DNA is
analyzed, his expectation of privacy in family ties may be part of the
“panoply of rights and protections” 127 to which his conviction disentitles
him. If so, a warrant would not be required and a totality of the
circumstances test would apply. 128 It should be noted that, although YSTR typing may not require a warrant, that is only one part of the
ongoing conversation about whether familial searching is a good
policy. 129
Under that totality of the circumstances test, the government’s need
for the information is compelling. The government’s interest in solving
and preventing crime is an important interest; Y-STR typing is
performed if the thirteen common STR markers partially match, and YSTR typing increases the accuracy of familial searching thereby
narrowing the number of leads the police must follow.
However, under the exposed information approach, a warrant would
likely be needed if Y-STR typing were expanded to other groups of
individuals whose DNA has been collected. It has been argued that
limiting familial searches to convicts is “legally, logically, and morally
unjustified,” and it should be broadened to other groups of people—
arrestees, voluntary contributors, and crime victims—to offset concerns
about the discriminatory impact of familial searching. 130 Under the
exposed information approach, this proposal intrudes upon these
individuals’ privacy interests, which in some cases may require a
warrant to be reasonable. For example, performing Y-STR typing on
DNA taken from a crime victim who has not lost the same privacy
interests as a convicted person would likely require probable cause and a
127. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a conviction lowers
a person’s expectation of privacy in their identity, and therefore, no warrant or suspicion is required
under the Fourth Amendment to collect DNA from a convicted felon and to create an identifying DNA
profile).
128. Or, in some jurisdictions, a special needs approach would be used.
129. See generally Murphy, supra note 57.
130. Id. at 41 (generally arguing against familial searching but also exploring best methods if it is
used).
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warrant.
Defining the zone of a search as only the information that was
actually exposed strikes the better balance between privacy interests and
the need for evidence collection. It requires the court to consider
whether new tests on stored DNA are reasonable. Alternatively, under
the physical specimen approach, courts would never reach the
reasonableness issue. This approach is also better supported by case law
than an approach that bases the zone of a search on the physical contours
of the DNA specimen, which would extinguish privacy interests in all
the information contained in that specimen.
Additionally, examining these approaches in the novel context of
searching a DNA specimen that has already been collected and tested for
another purpose illustrates that when a large amount of intermingled
information is stored in a small space, it no longer makes sense to base
Fourth Amendment protection on penetrating boundaries and the right to
enter a space. Instead, as we are able to access more information that is
stored in complex ways in systems that are not separated by clear
boundaries, Fourth Amendment law will continue shifting to focus more
on the content of a search and the information that is revealed.
D. Statutory Alternative
Of course, constitutional protection is not the only way to guard
genetic privacy while allowing the government to conduct important
analyses. If courts do not limit DNA analysis as a constitutional matter,
then legislatures should so limit it. A statute could accomplish the same
goals as the Fourth Amendment if it protects individuals from
unnecessarily intrusive analyses of their DNA and provides a remedy for
the criminal, psychological, and financial harms resulting from
violations of the statute or from sharing incidental findings.
States might augment particularity by requiring that applications for a
DNA warrant require a particular description of the type of genetic
information sought, rather than simply a statement of whose DNA is to
be taken and for what general purpose. When DNA is taken and tested
without a warrant, the statute itself should limit the purposes for which
DNA can be analyzed. Some states already have DNA statutes that do
this. For example, California’s DNA statute indicates that the state
“shall perform DNA analysis and other forensic identification analysis
pursuant to this chapter only for identification purposes.” 131 Other
states, however, do not limit the purposes for which DNA can be

131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 295.1 (West 2010) (emphasis added).
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analyzed. For example, South Carolina’s DNA statute states a very
broad purpose, which might include anything: to “develop DNA profiles
on samples for law enforcement purposes and for humanitarian and
nonlaw enforcement purposes,” 132 which will have several uses,
including “generat[ing] investigative leads in criminal investigations.” 133
If constitutional limits to analysis do not suffice, it would be important
that the legislators reconsider this open-ended approach to DNA analysis
and instead impose clear rules regarding the purposes for which DNA
can be tested.
These statutes must also include back-loaded privacy protections that
limit what happens with genetic information after it is revealed and
provide remedies for the individual if the statute is violated. Most state
DNA statutes already count unauthorized analysis of stored DNA or
sharing the results of DNA analyses as a criminal offense; in most of
these states, it is a misdemeanor. 134 These statutory prohibitions
penalize the violator with fines and possible jail time.
But most of these statutes are silent about whether the individual
whose DNA has been accessed has any remedy. None of the state
statutes include any remedy if an unauthorized DNA analysis were to
reveal genetic information that could be used as evidence. Even if a
DNA analysis violates the statute, a court would not per se exclude any
DNA evidence yielded. 135
Additionally, only a few states mention financial remedies for the
individual whose DNA has been accessed in violation of the statute.
These states create ceilings or floors for the financial recovery. For
example, in California, if a DNA sample is used for any purpose other
than criminal identification or if DNA database information is
improperly shared, the person whose DNA is affected will receive
$5,000 in damages for each violation, up to $50,000, and no other civil
liability will attach to the violation. 136 In Nebraska, if a person’s DNA
sample or genetic information is shared for pecuniary gain, then the
person will receive at least $100 in damages. 137 Most states are silent
about whether a person can bring a civil lawsuit if their DNA is tested or
their genetic information is shared in violation of the statute.
132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-610 (2010).
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-640 (2010).
134. AXELRAD, supra note 85 (listing both criminal penalties and civil causes of action given rise
to by state DNA laws).
135. People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 66–67 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 72 (2010)
(holding that DNA evidence would not be excluded because even though its collection was not
sanctioned under statute at the time it was collected, the collection was reasonable).
136. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(i)(2)(A) (West 2010).
137. NEB. REV. ST. § 29-4105 (2010).
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If these state statutes were to become the only limitations on DNA
analysis, then they must also include remedies for the individual who is
aggrieved by the unauthorized DNA analysis or data sharing. These
remedies should include an exclusionary clause that prevents the new
genetic information from being used as evidence in court. Perhaps more
importantly, because most of the negative consequences of violating a
person’s genetic privacy follow from out of court uses, these remedies
should also include a cause of action to claim damages arising from the
violation.
Additionally, legislatures might consider adopting a notification
requirement when new tests are run on a person’s DNA. A requirement
that individuals be notified when their DNA is tested might guard
against unnecessary testing and would give people aggrieved by DNA
testing the opportunity to seek remedies.
Currently, this level of statutory protection is unnecessary because the
forensic DNA testing methods used now are targeted and focused. If
DNA testing methods change to be more varied in scope or more
intrusive, then statutes may need to more closely regulate genetic
testing.
Although many of the same protections can be accomplished through
statute, if the Fourth Amendment is to remain meaningful as technology
allows the government to glean more information through laboratory
analysis, then the Fourth Amendment principles must account for the
realities of these new searches. DNA is just one instance of a
technologically advanced search that is hard to limit using Fourth
Amendment rules that focus on the spatial boundaries of a search rather
than the content of the information revealed by that search.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment has traditionally focused on whether the
boundaries of a particular space can be penetrated, not on what
information is contained in that space. The traditional approach still
works reasonably well when limiting government intrusion to a
computer, but not when applied to a DNA specimen that has already
been tested, leaving private genetic information exposed. Some courts
applying the Fourth Amendment to regulate searches of computers have
developed approaches more sensitive to the information that has been
exposed. Drawing from this computer-search case law, this Article
proposed that any analysis of stored DNA samples that reveals new
information must be both reasonable and justified, requiring either a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, new analyses
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like the familial searching that identified a relative of the Grim Sleeper
could be conducted. But in situations when the government’s need does
not justify intruding upon individuals’ privacy, the stored DNA will
remain undisturbed.
Evaluating the Fourth Amendment in this context indicates that the
content of what is exposed by the search, as opposed to the form of the
search, will play an increasingly important role in determining what
constitutes a search and whether a search is reasonable as investigatory
tools are able to capture more information from spaces that lack clear
boundaries. For example, other biological specimens also contain a
large amount of information in very small spaces, and more of that
information is becoming interpretable as science progresses. 138 Under
the approach proposed by this Article, privacy interests in these
specimens will be protected even after they have been seized, tested, and
stored, thus permitting necessary evidence collection without revealing
all the secrets hidden in our bodies.

138. For example, microbe communities found in human waste are being studied for forensic
uses. See generally The Nat’l Inst. of Health Common Fund, Human Microbiome Project Program
Initiatives, http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/hmp/initiatives.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). And brain-imaging
technology allows large volumes of data about brain function to be acquired, which can later be
analyzed in different ways, revealing information about how we think and, potentially in the future,
revealing what we think. Dov Fox, Brain Imaging and the Bill of Rights: Memory Detection
Technologies and American Criminal Justice, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34 (2008); see also Teneille Brown &
Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal
Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119 (2010).
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